ABSTRACT Publicly Verifiable Computation (PVC) enables computationally weak trusted sources to outsource several computations to some more powerful public untrusted clouds. On issuing a query, the public cloud replies the result of the function evaluation with a witness vouching for correctness of computation. This primitive requires high efficiency and public verifiability. However, existing PVC constructions all request trusted sources to know delegated function beforehand, and thus it fails to meet diverse requirements, especially outsourced target unknown need to be jointly computed among different entities in a privacy-preserving manner. To strengthen current PVC's flexibility, we proposed a new primitive called Secure Collaborative PVC (SCPVC), where TTP is responsible only for initializing system parameter and publishing some information in its bulletin. After some rounds, the public cloud owns lots of functions outsourced in PVC ways. The private cloud works out an algebraic operation structure L, which involves some functions provided by public cloud and himself. Based on L, they jointly perform the protocol to generate the target function. At the end of the protocol, the public cloud obtains target function while not disclosing respective secrets. Due to the misbehavior of the public cloud, this mechanism allows the private cloud to check the integrity of target function and any client to verify the correctness of results. Our scheme without jointly computing is a typical existing PVC scheme. Therefore, our protocol is compatible with the prevailing publicly verifiable computation Scheme. Before investigating SCPVC, we tailored two secure two-party polynomial computation protocols using 1-out-of-l Oblivious Transfer protocol as the main building block to SCPVC. More preciously, polynomial multiplication protocol transforms two polynomials multiplication into another two addition such that the result of sum is equal to the result of multiplication. Similarly, polynomial addition protocol is as same as multiplication protocol converts two polynomials addition into another two multiplication.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of cloud computing [1] - [3] , publicly verifiable computation (PVC) has drawn widespread attention due to integrity guarantees. However, current existing PVC schemes only support one form that the outsourced functions known by delegator in advance, therefore, it is impossible to meet diverse individual user requirements different forms of PVC. Consider as an example the following scenario: in PVC setting, some different trusted sources have developed several cloud applications and wants to make it available to its clients. Due to the limited computational resources, these application cannot be executed locally and needs to be outsourced to a public cloud. Then, the public cloud owns lots of outsourced functions and performs these computation-intensive algorithm for the public. Supposed one of these is a rainfall function f a,1 (x) . Recently, an agricultural company works out an algebraic operation structure L = f a,1 * f b,1 + f b,2 to forecast disease and insect pest, where f a,1 is the identifier of the rainfall function f a,1 (x) shared in the public cloud, and f b,i is the identifier of secret function f b,i (x) for i ∈ [2] shared in its private trusted cloud. Noted that any client of public cloud have no access permission to the private cloud expect the company employees. More exactly, only the employees have the access permission to obtain the evaluations of the secret function f b,i (x) deployed on the private trusted cloud. In order to produce the target function L(x) = f a,1 (x) * f b,1 (x) + f b,2 (x) to forecast disease and insect pest, the private cloud want the public cloud to share the rainfall function f a,1 (x) with him.
However, for some economic interests, the public cloud is not willing to share the rainfall function f a,1 (x) with the company, hence, without f a,1 (x), the company will fail to generate the target function. In such setting, only the employees could get the transcript of the target function exposing algebraic operation structure L to them. Based on the algebraic operation structure L, they should issue the same query three times to corresponding function on public or private cloud and reconstruct the replies to generate the results. Supposed the others want to get the transcripts of L(x), how to do it without the private cloud access permissions. However, with the concern of privacy, usually this algebraic operation structure L could not be exposed to employees, and how to get the outcome of L(x) for the employees without L.
In such setting, undoubtedly, there exist lots of vulnerabilities: 1) tedious for employees to request three times if L is public to them. 2) impossible for employees to get the transcript of the target function if L is secret. 3) impossible for the company or public cloud to generate the target function. 4) impossible for the others to receive the transcript of target function. Hence, the challenges are how to jointly compute the target function while preserving the confidentiality of respective functions provided by different parties.
To simultaneously handle all above vulnerabilities particularly well, we firstly proposed a new cryptographic primitive called Secure Collaborative PVC (SCPVC) in a privacypreserving way. That is a compromise solution: private cloud and public cloud jointly perform the protocol without disclosing respective secret functions. At the end of execution, only the public cloud obtains target function, and the private cloud will learn nothing about the target function. In this protocol, any parties either in the public cloud or in the private cloud could get the evaluation of target function. Furthermore, SCPVC generates a signature vouching for the integrity of target function and correctness of the computation over some input. For function integrity checking, the private cloud firstly check whether the target functions is correct comparing signatures for equality. If not, abort protocol. Otherwise, announce description of target function to the public (i.e. the public cloud owns a forecasting disease and insect pest function) and share it with others. For result correctness verifying, any result recipient not only including employees but also others could verify whether the computation is performed correctly using the public key published by TTP who just initializes some system parameter and learns nothing about details of any function involved in the protocol.
A. OUR RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The main achievement of this paper is a new paradigm called Secure Collaborative PVC scheme, such that it strengthens existing PVC's flexibility, and it can be worked on the top of existing PVC schemes. One of our technical highlights can make public and private cloud jointly generate a target function without revealing respective secret input functions. Our major results and contributions as follows.
1) DEFINITION OF NEW NOTION
We formally define Secure Collaborative PVC (SCPVC) and its security.
2) TWO TAILORED SECURE TWO-PARTY POLYNOMIAL COMPUTATION PROTOCOLS
In order to extend the existing PVC's flexibility (i.e. SCPVC), we first tailor two secure two-party polynomial computation supporting polynomial multiplication and addition in secure two-party computation setting. Whichever protocol is conducted, Alice all do the same operation. Multiplication protocol translates two secret polynomials multiplication into another two polynomials addition such that the result of sum is equal to the result of multiplication. Addition protocol converts two secret polynomials addition into another two polynomials multiplication. Based on two above protocols, we also design a secure two-party polynomial modular protocol. Furthermore, these two protocols all satisfy the requirement of secure two-party computation protocol.
3) COMPATIBLE WITH THE PREVAILING PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION SCHEMES
In PVC scheme, cloud service providers are already equipped some computations for their delegators, so the computations should remain executed in its existing form. In short, computations in public cloud must be persistent. Our scheme without jointly computing (i.e. Algorithm ComputePoly, VerifyPoly) is the typical existing PVC scheme.
4) INGENIOUS SCHEME
Our construction for polynomial is based on the bilinear groups, and produces a witness to vouch for correctness of the computation using polynomial decomposition theorem. In our scheme, the public cloud would learn nothing about the secret algebraic operation structure and which function is involved in jointly computing, except the target function. Finally, we give a rigorous proof of the security of proposed scheme.
B. RELATED WORK
The research of verifiable outsourced computation mainly aims to check the correctness of the computation replied by an untrusted powerful server. This subject involves lots of prior work such as Interactive Proofs (IPs) [4] - [6] , Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs) [7] - [9] , commitments and CS Proofs [10] , [11] . However, these approaches are still so theoretical that fails to be applicable to practice because verification costs less effort than computation.
In 2010, Gennaro [12] firstly introduced and formalized the notion of Verifiable Computation for arbitrary function with non-interactive verification. In 2011, [13] proposed a problem that computing on large datasets stored on untrusted server. This paper presented a high degree polynomial verifiable computation based on the pseudo random functions. Furthermore, it supports update queries. All of above schemes only offers private verifiability. At the same year, [14] proposed a new primitive called publicly verifiable computation, which generalized authenticated data structures [15] - [21] , and verifiable computation in secret-key setting. This proposed scheme supported expressive manipulations over multivariate polynomials, which enabled any client to verify the correctness of the outcome. Another advantage was that verification cost is proportional to the size of the input rather than the degree of the polynomial. In next year, Prano et.al [22] extended verifiable computation in two major properties: public delegation and public verifiability, which formed publicly verifiable computation rudiment. This scheme showed how to meet these two requirement from any ABE scheme. In the same year, [23] presented new scheme for high degree polynomials evaluation and matrix multiplication in a stronger model. After that, lots of publicly verifiable computation schemes or systems have been put forward such as [24] - [28] .
To our best knowledge, no previous work in literature discusses the jointly computing case, which all need to know the outsourced function beforehand.
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II recalls some knowledge needed in our scheme beforehand. Section III introduce two tailored secure two-party polynomial computation protocols which are the main building block of our construction. Section IV formally defines a new primitive called SCPVC and its security. Section V shows how to construct SCPVC scheme using two tailored secure two-party polynomial computation protocols. Meanwhile, formal security games and proofs also can be found in this section. Finally, section VI makes a conclusion and extends some interesting and challenging open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES, DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We present some definitions that will be used in remaining paper. Let λ denote the security parameter. We say that a function negl(λ) is a negligible function of λ, if negl(λ) less than 1/p(λ), for all polynomials p(λ). In what follows, all adversaries are PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) algorithms with respect to a security parameter λ expect if stated otherwise. We denote with x ∈ R S the process of selecting x uniformly at random in S. Bold letters are used for n-dimension vector variables, i.e.,
A. BILINEAR MAP
We use the bilinear map generation PPT algorithm (e, g, G, G T , p) ←− BilinearMapGen(1 λ ) to generate a symmetric bilinear map e : G × G −→ G T , where G and G T are cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p which is a λ bits prime, g is the generator of group G, and the bilinear map e satisfies the following properties: (1) Bilinearity: e(P a , Q b ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z p ; (2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1 (3) Computability: e(P, Q) can be efficiently computed in PPT for all P, Q ∈ G.
The security property of our scheme can be proved using the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption and Bilinear q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. These assumptions are the following:
B. DISCRETE LOGARITHM (DL) ASSUMPTION
Let λ be the security parameter. Given a generator g of group G or G T , and α ∈ R Z * p , for arbitrary adversary
C. BILINEAR q STRONG DIFFIE-HELLMAN (Q-BSDH) ASSUMPTION
Let λ be the security parameter and (e, g, G, G T , p) be a tuple of bilinear pairing parameters invoking the BilinearMapGen algorithm on input λ. Given a q + 1-tuple
D. HOMOMORPHISM
Given two algebraic structures (G 1 , ⊕) and (G 2 , ⊗) (such as groups or rings), a homomorphism from (
be an n-variate polynomial. For arbitrary a random point β ∈ Z n p , there exists a PPT algorithm to find polynomials
We leverage mainly univariate polynomial in our scheme, in which case n = 1.
F. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER (OT)
The 1-out-of-p OT is a two-party protocol. Alice has p secrets m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m p ∈ {0, 1} k , and Bob has a selection bit i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p}. At the end of the protocol, Bob always get m i and learn nothing about the others. Similarly, Alice learns nothing about selection bit i. VOLUME 5, 2017 
III. SECURE TWO-PARTY POLYNOMIAL COMPUTATION PROTOCOLS
If Secure two-party computation is the problem of cooperatively evaluating a function f (x 1 , x 2 ) = (y 1 , y 2 ) by their secret inputs x 1 , x 2 among two parties P 1 , P 2 , such that each party P i (i ∈ {1, 2}) only obtains his own result y i while gets no knowledge of another's secret input x 3−i and output y 3−i . Secure two-party computation was first proposed by Yao [29] , meanwhile, an ingenious solution to this problem presented is called secure two-party computation protocol. Later, the subject of secure two-party computation attract lots of researchers' interest [30] - [34] . As a result, an increasing number of protocols are designed to resolve this issue. Furthermore, it is worth to note that there exist no generic or common protocols can be implied to solve special scenarios of secure two-party computation, i.e., specific protocols should be tailored for special cases such as ranking [29] , [35] , [36] , fairness [32] , [37] , [38] and so on. In this section, we present two custom-designed protocols supporting expressive manipulations for the special case-polynomial as well, such as polynomial multiplication, addition. These protocols all involve two parties, and both are semi-honest, which will be utilized in the following Secure Collaborative PVC protocol.
At a high level, these tailored protocols are developed all using 1-out-of-l Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol, satisfying, besides, requirement of secure two-party computation problem we discuss above. Secure two-party polynomial multiplication protocol transforms two secret polynomials multiplication into another two polynomials addition such that the result of sum is equal to the result of multiplication. Similarly, secure two-party polynomial addition protocol same as multiplication protocol converts two secret polynomials addition into another two polynomials multiplication. Finally, secure two-party polynomial module protocol is constructed on the basis of the multiplication protocol. However, the module protocol just produce one outputs, which is not same as the two above protocols with two outputs. For convenience, suppose two parties are Alice and Bob in above model. At a high level, no matter which protocol will be conducted, Alice all generates a m × l matrix to hide her secret polynomial. In the matrix, each row contains a special
These two detailed constructions will be described as follows.
A. SECURE TWO-PARTY POLYNOMIAL MULTIPLICATION PROTOCOL
A concrete problem, secure two-party polynomial multiplication computation, is described as follows: Alice has a secret polynomial f a (x) ∈ Z p [x] , and Bob also has a secret polynomial f b (x) ∈ Z p [x] . They intend to jointly translate polynomial multiplication on their own secret inputs f a (x) and f b (x) into another two polynomials addition by f a (x) and
is one output privately obtained by Alice, f b (x) is another one output privately obtained by Bob. Meanwhile, each party can't reduce f a (x) * f b (x), otherwise it will deviate far from this protocol, due to revealing the other party secret output (input) by subtracting (dividing) its secret output (input). An ingenious solution to the problem is constructed in the following protocol 1.At the end of the protocol, Alice gets corresponding output f a (x) adding all M i,index [i] [x] replied by Bob.
Intuitively, this protocol is feasible to meet the above requirements about this problem. At the start of this protocol, Bob independently samples m random polynomials of Bob's secret output f b (x) it is the sum, i.e.,
would not be disclosed to Alice. At the end of the protocol, in line 5.3 Alice , the other are arbitrary), Bob would derive which is the correct r index[i] (x) with the maximum probability 1/l. However, Alice's secret output f a (x) is the sum of m such random polynomials, therefore, the chance that f a (x) would be exposed to Bob is 1/l m . Because the l m is so big, 1/l m could be negligible. Likewise, Bob has a negligible probability of recovering the
and these are independently chosen by Bob. Thus, it is impossible for Alice to deduce f a (x) * f b (x).
B. SECURE TWO-PARTY POLYNOMIAL ADDITION PROTOCOL
A concrete problem, secure two-party polynomial addition computation, is described as follows: Alice has a secret polynomial f a (x) ∈ Z p [x] , and Bob also has a secret polynomial f b (x) ∈ Z p [x] . They intend to jointly translate polynomial addition on their own secret inputs f a (x) and f b (x) into another two polynomials multiplication by f a (x) and
, where f a (x) is one output privately obtained by Alice, f b (x) is another one output privately obtained by Bob. In addition, each party can't reduce f a (x) + f b (x), otherwise it will deviate far from this protocol, due to revealing the other party secret input (output) by subtracting (dividing) its secret input (output). An ingenious solution to the problem is constructed in the following protocol 2. Likewise, this protocol is feasible to meet the above requirements about the problem. The proof for protocol 2 is alike to the proof for protocol 1.
Remark 1: Although protocol 1 and 2 are totally different, Alice does in exactly the same way: whether in protocol 1 or protocol 2, Alice (1) 
(2) generates a secret random vector index to hide special 
1. Alice and Bob agree on two numbers l, m ∈ Z + , such that l m is so large (i.e. 1/l m ≈ negl(·)).
Alice chooses
3. Bob generates a random polynomial as its own secret output f b (x), and samples m random polynomials [x] together from i = 1 to m (both in the last line). Therefore, no matter which protocol will be conducted, Alice always do the above step.
Bob computes
M i,j [x] = r j (x)f b (x) − f b,j (x) from j = 1 to l.
IV. SECURE COLLABORATIVE PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION SCHEME
In subsection A, we firstly provide a formal definition of Secure Collaborative Publicly Verifiable Computation scheme, while subsection B presents a protocol in detail. Finally, we describe the correctness and security definitions for SCPVC in subsection C.
A. MODEL DEFINITION
We now formally define our notion of Secure Collaborative Publicly Verifiable Computation SCPVC = (Setup, Sign, ComputePoly, VerifyPoly, ComputeResult, VerifyResult) comprises the following six algorithms:
Run by a TTP only once at system initialization to establish a public key PK , an authorization key AK , and a large label σ i , 
1. Alice and Bob agree on two numbers l, m ∈ Z + , such that l m is so big (i.e. 1/l m ≈ negl(·)). m polynomials f a,1 (x), f a,2 (x 
Alice chooses
Bob generates a random polynomial f b (x) as its own secret output. 6. Alice and Bob jointly perform the following sub-steps from i = 1 to m.
6.1 Alice sends r 1 (x), r 2 (x), · · · , r l (x) to Bob, where
6.3 At the end of execution of 1-out-of-l Oblivious Transfer Protocol between Alice and Bob, Alice gets
where σ i is a rough description such as America. The inputs are the security parameter λ, and the family of functions F.
Jointly run by the public cloud and the private cloud. The inputs are the secret algebraic operation structure L F a ,F b hold by the private cloud to instruct how to generate target function and two function vectors F a ∈ F u , F b ∈ F v respectively provided by the public cloud and the private cloud where u, v ∈ Z + . The outputs, the target function L F a ,F b (x) and a label σ i is American rainfall).
Run by any entity holding the public key PK for F to output a signature C f (x) for function f (x) and a sub-label σ 
Run by the private cloud. It takes as input signature vector C F a , function vector F b , target function signature C L Fa,F b (x) , the authorization key AK and secret algebraic operation structure L F a ,F b . It outputs 1 if L F a ,F b (x) is computed correctly, or else 0.
Run by the public cloud to compute a result f (β) along with a witness ω β . The algorithm also takes as input a value β ∈ domain(f (x)), function f (x) and the public key PK .
Run by any entity using a value β ∈ domain(f (x)), signature C f (x) , the public key PK and the outputs from ComputeResult. It outputs 1 if the transcript is indeed the correct result, or else 0.
B. PROTOCOLS
In this section, we concisely describe how the above algorithms of Secure Collaborative Publicly Verifiable Computation scheme are applied in a multi-party protocol, mainly containing four entities: the trusted third party (TTP), the public cloud, the private cloud and client. We assume that the TTP and private cloud are trusted, but not the public cloud in this paper. In practice, many instances of each entity may exist. Without loss of generality, we consider the four-party case where a TTP with a bulletin, a public cloud, a private cloud, and a client C are involved. We firstly introduce the existing public verifiable computation scheme under our model. Then, our proposed scheme is presented in detail. Initially, the TTP involves Setup algorithm to generate a public key PK and an authorization key AK under the large label σ i . Then the TTP adds the label σ i and the public key PK to its public bulletin.
1) EXISTING PVC CASE
When an authorized delegator desires to outsource a function f (x) to the public cloud, the delegator will produce a signature C f (x) and a sub-label σ (k) i using Sign algorithm. Later, the delegator sends the function f (x) and sub-label σ and adds them to the public bulletin under the large label σ i . After several rounds of outsourcing, multiple functions and corresponding sub-labels are possessed by the pubic cloud while signatures and corresponding sub-labels are published on the bulletin. The client firstly finds its corresponding sublabel from the TTP's bulletins, if the client desires to query for one function. The client issues a query β with a corresponding sub-label σ (k) i to public cloud. According to the sub-label, the public cloud finds the corresponding outsourced function and executes algorithm ComputeResult to reply with the output pair (L F a ,F b (β), ω β ). Finally, the client involves VerifyResult algorithm to verify the correctness of the outcome.
2) JOINTLY COMPUTING CASES
When the private cloud holding F b and L F a ,F b desires to jointly generate the target function L F a ,F b (x) with the public cloud, the private cloud applies for the authorization key AK from the TTP. The public cloud and the private cloud jointly performs ComputePoly algorithm to output the target function only knew by the public cloud if the private cloud is authorized, or else abort the protocol. Later on, the public cloud conducts Sign algorithm to generate a signature C L Fa,F b (x) for the target function. Due to misbehavior of the public cloud, the private cloud conducts VerifyPoly algorithm to check whether output function
If not, abort the protocol. Otherwise, the private cloud sends sub-label σ
and C L Fa,F b (x) to TTP. Then, the client could issue a query to the target function and verify the correctness of the result in a similar way to existing schemes.
Remark 2: the TTP is responsible only for initializing system parameter rather than participating in jointly computing in our protocol. Therefore, the TTP learn nothing about the target function, each input secret function and algebraic operation structure. In addition, the bulletin merely contains the labels and corresponding signatures, hence, the TTP can not infer any corresponding function from these information.
Remark 3: no one can know the algebraic operation structure L F a ,F b , except the private cloud. More precisely, only the private cloud can determine which function will be contained and how to combine them.
Remark 4: at the end of jointly computing, the public cloud acquires the target function L F a ,F b (x). Therefore, any client either in public cloud or in private cloud all could get every evaluation of the target function just issuing one query to the public cloud.
Remark 5: in above protocol, the outsourced function f (x) may not have been known beforehand, which needs to be jointly produced by the public cloud and private cloud. If delegator knows f (x) in advance, the above protocol would be executed without algorithms ComputePoly and VerifyPoly. The delegator would conduct Sign algorithm to generate signature C f (x) , and send corresponding label and signature to TTP. Therefore, our SCPVC is compatible with existing PVC.
C. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY DEFINITION
In this section, we present the correctness and security definitions for SCPVC. Intuitively, this scheme is correct if whenever its algorithm are executed honestly, a correct answer will never be rejected. Similarly, this scheme is secure if a wrong output will never be accepted by a verifier.
1) DEFINITION OF SCPVC CORRECTNESS
A Secure Collaborative Publicly Verifiable Computation scheme for any function family F is correct if the follow-ing holds. It runs Setup algorithm to pick a public key PK and an authorization key AK under the large label σ i . For any u, v ∈ Z + , for any two function vector F a ∈ F u , F b ∈ F v , the ComputePoly algorithm produces the target function L F a ,F b (x), such that:
In the following, we present two security definitions. The former is used to check the integrity of target polynomial. Intuitively, whenever no adversary can convince any verifier to accept an incorrect polynomial with more than negligible probability negl(λ). The latter can be used to verify the correctness of evaluation. Similarly, whenever there does not exist arbitrary adversary persuading any verifier to accept a wrong result on its input with non-negligible probability.
2) DEFINITION OF SCPVC POLY-UNFORGEABILITY
A Secure Collaborative Publicly Verifiable Computation scheme for any function family F is poly-unforgeability if arbitrary PPT adversary A cannot win the following security experiment with non-negligible probability:
Setup: The challenger B performs (PK , AK , σ i ) ← Setup(1 λ , F) and makes PK and σ i public known but keeps AK privately. Then, B returns PK and σ i to A.
Phase 1: A can query following oracles for polynomial times.
•
, AK ) and returns the output to A.
Challenge:
Phase 2: A can query oracles in similar manner to Phase 1. Guess: A forges and outputs a wrong target function
3) DEFINITION OF SCPVC RESULT-UNFORGEABILITY
A Secure Collaborative Publicly Verifiable Computation scheme for any function family F is result-unforgeability if arbitrary PPT adversary A cannot win the following security experiment with non-negligible probability: Setup: The challenger B performs (PK , AK , σ i ) ← Setup(1 λ , F) and makes PK and σ i public known but keeps AK privately. Then, B returns PK and σ i to A.
• O ComputePoly (F a , F b , PK , L F a ,F b ) : Given two secret function verctors F a , F b and secret algebraic operation structure
, ω β ) and returns the output to A.
Phase 2: A can query oracles in a similar manner to Phase 1.
Guess: A forges and outputs a wrong pair (
V. SECURE COLLABORATIVE PUBLICLY VERIFIABLE COMPUTATION SCHEME FOR POLYNOMIAL
In subsection A, we present an instantiation of our main construction for univariate polynomial, while subsection B give a security proof theoretically including proof of Poly-Unforgeability and Result-Unforgeabilty introduced in section IV. Finally, we extend instantiation to multivariate polynomial and gives a sketch of security proof in subsection C. VOLUME 5, 2017 A. SCPVC SCHEME FOR UNIVARIATE POLYNOMIAL
For any function family F ⊆ Z p [x] , the Setup algorithm firstly invokes the bilinear map generation algorithm BilinearMapGen on input λ to generate a bilinear pairings parameters (e, g, G, G T , p). Next, it samples a random point α ∈ R Z p as an authorization key AK . It then generates a (q+1) tuples < g, g α , g α 2 , · · · , g α q >, where q is bounded by poly(λ). Finally, the TTP makes PK = [(e, g, G, G T , p) , < g, g α , g α 2 , · · · , g α q >] and the rough description σ i publicly known but holds AK = α privately.
The secret algebraic operation structure L F a ,F b guides how to generate the target function layer by layer. More preciously, each layer conducts which tailored protocol and takes as input which polynomial in F a , F b , or in intermediate calculations.
Until the last layer of operations is performed, the public cloud would get the target function. Finally, the private cloud attaches a description σ 2 for an example to compute the target polynomial. In term of L F a ,F b , the computation is divided into two layers. In the first layer, set
and f b (x) = −f b,2 (x) in protocol 1, and execute it. In the end of the protocol, the public cloud outputs f 1,a (x) = f a (x). In the second layer, the private cloud notify the public cloud to produce the target function adding f 1,a (x) and f a,2 . Finally, the public cloud computes the target function L F a ,F b (x). Noted that the public cloud can not distinguish which protocol is conducted (whether in protocol 1 or protocol 2, the public cloud all performs the same operations as we discussed in remark 1). What is more, the operation is just with respective to their own functions in the last layer. Hence, the public cloud learn nothing about L F a ,F b .
Let f (x) denote an outsourced polynomial over Z p [x] and the respective coefficients are c 1 ,
This algorithm first computes
algorithm VerifyPoly checks if the following equation holds:
Although the private cloud does not possess L F a ,F b (x), it could still compute the g L Fa,F b (AK ) in the following way:
is also divided into layers in term of L F a ,F b , each layer containing either additive operations or multiplicative operations. To evaluate a layer of additive operations, the private cloud can rely on the homomorphic properties. To evaluate a layer of multiplicative operations, the private cloud can do some power operation, in which the base is C f a,i (x) and the exponent is f a,j (AK ) where i ∈|F a |, j ∈|F b |. Also take the instance in algorithm ComputePoly as an example, compute g 2(x) are published in the public bulletin of the public cloud, and f b,1 (AK ) and f b,2 (AK ) are computed in E b at the begin of this algorithm.
On issuing a query β, the algorithm computes f (β). Using Polynomial decomposition Theorem as defined in section II, it generates q(x) = f (x)−f (β)
x−β . Finally, it outputs the pair (f (β), ω β ), where ω β = g q(α) is computed in a similar manner to C f (x) in above Sign algorithm.
To check the correctness of the evaluation, it verifies whether the following condition holds:
If this condition holds, the algorithm accepts the result and outputs 1, else it rejects and output 0.
Algorithm VerifyResult is correct because
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
It is not difficult to examine correctness of the SCPVC scheme by referring to algorithm VerifyPoly and VerifyResult in our scheme. In what follows, we focus on it's security proof.
1) PROOF FOR POLY-UNFORGEABILITY
If there exists a PPT adversary A with non-negligible advantage against above experiment for Poly-Unforgeability, A can forge an incorrect polynomial L F a ,F b (x) that accepted by algorithm Verifypoly and construct an algorithm B to solve the q-SDH problem. Namely, B can efficiently compute and know AK = α maintained privately by the private cloud. Because the authorized private cloud holds authorization key AK = α and its own function verctor F b , he can get the result of each function f b,i (x) ∈ F b on input α. Sequently, based on its own secret algebraic operation structure L F a ,F b , the private cloud can always correctly generate the target function signature C L Fa,F b (x) layer by layer using the homomorphic property. Take
where the signatures C f a,1 (x) , C f a,2 (x) are public in the TTP's public bulletins.
For target function signature
. Due to the homomorphic property of signature, the signature
Hence, factoring ψ(x) will get a root α of ψ(x) = 0 and break q-SDH assumption.
2) PROOF FOR RESULT-UNFORGEABILITY
If there exists a PPT adversary A with non-negligible advantage against above experiment for Result-Unforgeability, A can forge a wrong pair (L F a ,F b (β), ω β ) that accepted by algorithm VerifyResult and construct an algorithm B to solve the q-BSDH problem. Namely, B can efficiently compute the value e(g, g) 
Similarly, for correct pair (L F a ,F b (β), ω β ), we have as below:
Due to Equations 5.1 and 5.2, it is not hard to see that:
e(g, g) (α−β)q (α) e(g, g)
= e(g, g) (α−β)q(α) e(g, g)
e(g, g)
(α−β)q (α)−(α−β)q(α)
= e(g, g)
As a result, e(g, g) It is so easy to see that the right-hand side of Equation 5.3 provides an efficient method to break the q-BSDH assumption.
C. SCPVC SCHEME FOR MULTIVARIATE POLYNOMIAL
With minor modifications SCPVC scheme for univariate polynomial can be turned into to multivariate polynomial SCPVC scheme. Let f (x) ∈ Z p [x] be an n-variate polynomial where x = [x 1 , · · · , x n ]. Supposed our scheme is applied to n-variate polynomial, below we outline how this can be done.
More specifically, in algorithm Setup, the TTP takes the same steps described above, except replacing α with a n-dimension point α = [α 1 , · · · , α n ] ∈ R Z n p as AK and < g, g α , g α 2 , · · · , g α q > with < g i (a i ) j i : sum(j i ) ≤q, j i ∈ Z p > as part of the PK . Any remaining algorithm is similar to the original but the dimension extending in our new scheme, so we would not describe in detail for convenience. Note that the public cloud would compute n polynomials q 1 (x), · · · , q n (x) using polynomial decomposition, where
for all i ∈ [n]. Therefore, the witness ω β consist of n elements ω β,1 , · · · , ω β,n , such that ω β,i = g q i (α) for all i ∈ [n].
The security proof for univariate polynomial can be easily extended to the n-variate case, the idea of security proof of the n-variate case remains the same as the univariate case. For the sake of brevity, we do not present it.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have introduced the new primitive of Secure Collaborative Publicly Verifiable Computation (SCPVC), which aimed to enhance existing PVC's flexibility. In PVC setting, SCPVC provides a privacy-preserving manner to allow two different entities to jointly compute the outsourced target function while not exposing respective secret to the other one. We note that the construction presented in this paper supports some polynomial algebraic operations. However, constructing efficient SCPVC schemes for other expressive manipulations is still a useful future work.
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